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Abstract
The standard two-period law enforcement model is considered
in a setting where individuals usually, but not exclusively, commit
crimes only after comparing expected costs and benets. Where es-
calating punishment schemes are present, there is an inherent value
in keeping a clean criminal record; a person with a record may unin-
tentionally become a repeat o¤ender if he fails to exert self-control,
and be punished more severely. If the punishment for repeat o¤end-
ers is su¢ ciently high, one may rationally forgo the opportunity of
committing a protable crime today to avoid being sanctioned as a
repeat o¤ender in the future. Therefore, partial deterrence can be
achieved at a very low cost through the use of escalating penalties,
providing a behavioral justication for punishing repeat o¤enders
more severely.
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1. Introduction
The scheme of punishing repeat o¤enders more severely than rst time of-
fenders is still puzzling from a law and economics perspective.1 Although the
law and economics literature on escalating punishment schemes is broad and "es-
calating"2 not many articles appear to provide satisfying economic rationales for
repeat o¤ender laws.3 As one scholar very recently pointed out "[a]s intuitively
appealing as [escalating] schemes appear, however, it has proven surprisingly
di¢ cult to show that they are consistent with an optimal (cost-minimizing)
enforcement policy" Miceli (2012 p. 1).
The main objective of this article is to demonstrate that the strict assump-
tions in most economic analyses concerning the nature of o¤enders may be
responsible for their inability to provide satisfying justications for repeat of-
fender laws. Despite many empirical studies, anecdotal evidence, and legal
commentary providing support for the contrary,4 mainstream economic analy-
ses continue to assume that o¤enders decide rationally, and that they always
consciously maximize expected net-benets.5 Meaningful departures from this
assumption, especially in the context of criminal law and even more specically
in analyzing repeat o¤ender lawsare likely to increase the explanatory power
of law and economics.6
More than forty years ago, Stigler noted that "[t]he rst-time o¤ender may
have committed the o¤ense almost accidentally and (given any punishment)
with negligible probability of repetition, so heavy punishments (which have
substantial costs to the state) are unnecessary" (Stigler (1970 pp. 528-529)).
1See, e.g., Emons (2007 p. 171) stating that "[f ]or the well developed law and economics
literature on deterrence escalating sanction schemes are still puzzling", and Utset (2007 p.
664), sub-section IV. E. The Puzzle of Higher Sanctions for Repeat O¤enders. See also
Polinsky and Shavell (1998) reviewing the previous law and economics literature, as well as
criminal law scholarship, and concluding that "[t]he question of whether sanctions should
depend on prior convictions has not been adequately addressed in the standard economic
model of deterrence" Polinsky and Shavell (1998 p. 306).
2This refers to the title of Miceli (2012): Escalating Interest in Escalating Penalties.
3See Miceli (2012) providing a survey of the existing law enforcement literature on es-
calating punishment schemes, and concluding that "[e]conomic theory has had a hard time
rationalizing this practice" Miceli (2012 at abstract ). One explanation might be that eco-
nomic analyses are incapable of providing such rationales, because recidivism laws reect the
maximization of non-economic or non-consequentialist values. The objective of this article is
not to investigate whether this is true, but to demonstrate that economic analyses may be
capable of providing stronger rationales once they incorporate behavioral assumptions.
4See, e.g., Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler (1998), Robinson and Darley (2004) and McAdams
and Ulen (2009) reviewing existing empirical studies. Korobkin and Ulen (2000) is an example
of legal commentary arguing for the removal of the rational choice assumption from law and
economics.
5An exception is Emons (2007) which is briey reviewed later in this section.
6McAdams (2012) also highlights the importance of departures from standard assump-
tions (e.g. through the incorporation of weakness of will, impulsiveness, myopia, or bounded
willpower (McAdams (2012 p. 1607)) in studying criminal law ). Unlike the instant article,
McAdams (2012) is mainly concerned with implications concerning general deterrence and
addiction. Similarly, Mungan (2012) argues that if economic analyses incorporate behavioral
assumptions they can provide satisfying rationales for a variety of prevalent practices in crim-
inal law including punishing repeat o¤enders more severely. However, that article, unlike the
instant one, relies on the information revealing function of criminal law rules and procedures.
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Later, in 1991, Cooter observed that "[p]eople often commit torts or crimes
due to weakness of will" (Cooter (1991) p. 149) and attempted to incorporate
"weakness of will" into the standard economic theory. Since then, many scholars
have pointed out and documented that some o¤enses are committed impulsively
rather than as a result of conscious decision making guided by a cost-benet
analysis.7 Despite these developments, there have not been many attempts to
incorporate decision-makers who lack full self-control into the law enforcement
literature analyzing repeat o¤ender laws.8 This is the purpose of this article:
to demonstrate how the simplest law enforcement model becomes capable of
providing an economic rationale for escalating penalty schemes when weak-willed
potential o¤enders are considered.
By weak-willed, I mean potential o¤enders who ordinarily possess self-control,
but who may lapse into committing crime.9 An individual who possesses self-
control decides whether or not to commit crime based on a cost-benet analysis,
whereas a person who acts impulsively fails to consider the consequences of his
actions. Perhaps paradoxically, this approach allows the formalization of what
might be perceived as over-compliance in standard law enforcement models; in-
dividuals may forgo the opportunity of committing seemingly protable crimes.
In other words, a person may choose to comply with a law, even if breaking
that law would lead to a sanction that costs less than the criminal benets to
the potential o¤ender. Though this may seem puzzling, many of us engage in
this type of behavior frequently.
One may not report a minor car accident to his insurance company, even if he
knows his insurance rate will not go up with the reporting of a single accident.
Similarly, a person may prefer not to speed, even if by doing so she would
obtain benets greater than the cost of the speeding ticket. Both examples
provide hints as to why the weak-willed potential o¤ender may prefer to comply
with the law even if the criminal benet is higher than the sanction for rst
time o¤enders. The persons decision is guided by future considerations in both
examples. The insured does not report the minor accident, because he wants to
have the ability to report more expensive accidents in the future without having
increases in his policy rate. The driver may abstain from speeding, because she
wants to be able to accumulate points on her drivers license in future and
more important occasions that will require her to speed. Just like these two
individuals, the weak-willed potential o¤ender has a reason to do something
that is not in his short-term best interest. He complies with the law today, so
that he preserves a clean record when he lapses in the future and commits a
crime. This way he avoids the penalty for repeat o¤enders, which is ordinarily
greater than the penalty for rst time o¤enders. I call this over-complicance
generating e¤ect of escalating penalties the temporal spillover e¤ect.
7See, e.g. Robinson and Darley (2004) and the references cited therein. See also McAdams
(2012) reviewing the existing economics literature studying willpower in the context of criminal
law.
8For exceptions, see Utset (2007) and Baumann and Friehe (2012), which are briey dis-
cussed below.
9Section 3.1. discusses how this assumption relates to the literature on present-bias.
3
If punishment is costly, as is clearly the case when imprisonment is used,
then one can take advantage of potential o¤endersanticipatory behavior. A
high sanction for repeat o¤enders deters individuals who currently possess self-
control, even if the punishment for a rst time o¤ender is very low. By setting
the punishment for rst time o¤enders very low, and the sanction for repeat of-
fenders su¢ ciently high, one can simultaneously deter individuals with a clean
record and minimize the cost of punishing individuals who lapse and commit
crime. The possibility of achieving a degree of deterrence while reducing pun-
ishment costs makes escalating penalties socially desirable. This justication
for escalating punishments relies on the assumption that individuals lack full
self-control, and rarely lapse into committing crime; but for this assumption,
individuals would not have a reason to forgo protable criminal opportunities,
because once they build up a criminal record, they can simply stop committing
crimes.
This rationale does not rely on specic assumptions concerning the e¢ ciency
of o¤enses. Justications for escalating penalty schemes exist when crimes are
ine¢ cient, but also when some are e¢ cient. Similarly, optimal escalating penal-
ties are present when criminal benets enter the social calculus as well as when
they do not. Moreover, it is not necessary to assume that punishment costs
more when committed by individuals who lapse. These assumptions are in
some regards weaker than those used in other articles analyzing the economics
of repeat o¤ender laws that incorporate individuals who are punished without
(breaking or) intending to break the law. Examples include Emons (2007),
Chu et al. (2000), and Mungan (Forthcoming). Emons (2007) incorporates
individuals who may accidentally commit crimes, and concludes that if crimi-
nal benets are in a certain parametric range, then escalating punishments are
optimal. That article, unlike the instant one, relies on criminals having history-
independent strategies (i.e. they either always or never intentionally commit
crime), punishment being costless, and the existence of a constraint on the total
sanctions that can be imposed on criminals. Chu et al. (2000) consider an
imperfect legal system which convicts innocent individuals with a certain prob-
ability, whereas Mungan (Forthcoming) focuses on the possibility of individuals
being uninformed of the illegality of various acts. The last two articles assume
that there are social costs associated with the punishment of innocent and un-
informed individuals, respectively, and conclude that the punishment of repeat
o¤enders can be justied on grounds that they reduce such costs.
I am not claiming that the economic rationale identied in this article is the
only or most important- one that provides a justication for escalating punish-
ment schemes. My primary objective is to demonstrate that simple behavioral
assumptions can provide strong economic justications for repeat o¤ender laws,
even under the simplest sets of assumptions. Accordingly, the instant article is
complementary to the existing literature, which generally does not rely on be-
havioral assumptions, and contains at least three broad sub-categories.10 One
10See Miceli (2012) for another review of the existing literature on escalating punishment
schemes.
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line of research asserts that the stigmatization e¤ect of the rst criminal penalty
may give it greater force than subsequent penalties, which may make escalating
punishment schemes optimal (e.g. Funk (2004), Rasmusen (1996) and Miceli
and Bucci (2005)). Another strand of literature points out that individuals
may have di¤erent tendencies to commit crime. In this framework, escalating
penalties can be used to distinguish between high-tendency and low-tendency
criminals (e.g. McCannon (2009), Miceli (2012), Mungan (2012), Polinsky and
Rubinfeld (1991) and Utset (2007)). Finally, there are articles suggesting that
o¤enders may learn how to avoid detection and/or relevant characteristics of
the criminal system (e.g. Friehe (2009) and Mungan (2010)). This could in-
crease the tendency of repeat o¤enders to commit crimes, justifying more severe
punishment. The observations made in these three strands of literature should
be equally valid when people occasionally lack self-control, and therefore the
instant article complements this literature.
This article also complements the emerging theoretical literature incorporat-
ing behavioral assumptions into the analysis of optimal punishments for repeat
o¤enders. Emons (2007), briey discussed above, assumes that criminals oc-
casionally commit crime by accident. That assumption is functionally very
similar to the lapsing assumption incorporated in this article. But, because
Emons (2007) assumes that punishment is costless and because criminals must
choose from history-independent strategies, it is unable to capture the temporal
spillover e¤ect identied in this article. Baumann and Friehe (2012) considers
individuals who su¤er from present-bias, who are, at least to some degree, aware
of their self-control problems. These individuals resemble, to some extent, those
that are considered in this article. A present-biased criminal, like an individual
who experiences a lapse, may commit a non-protable11 crime "when the crim-
inal benet is immediate and the expected sanction is heavily discounted due
to the individuals present bias."12 Bauman and Friehe (2012) asks a positive
and di¤erent question than the normative one posed in this article: can self-
reporting be used as a commitment device by present-biased individuals when
escalating penalties are present? Thus, whereas Baumann and Friehe (2012)
take escalating penalty schemes as given and investigate the potential implica-
tions of such schemes, the instant article demonstrates that a temporal spillover
e¤ect emerges and shows that this e¤ect provides a partial justication for re-
peat o¤ender laws. Utset (2007) also considers present-biased o¤enders, and
comments on how escalating penalties can be used to separate between o¤end-
ers with di¤erent levels of present-bias.13 Unlike the instant article, it does
not consider costly sanctions or the possibility of o¤enders potentially having
uctuating degrees of self-control, and therefore does not capture the temporal
spillover e¤ect identied in this article.
To formalize the temporal spillover e¤ect of punishing repeat o¤enders more
severely, and to demonstrate how this e¤ect might make escalating penalties
11To be specic a non-protable crime is one for which the present discounted value of the
expected sanction o¤-sets the benet from crime.
12Baumann and Friehe (2012) at 728.
13Utset (2007 at 664).
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optimal, I use a standard two-period model of law enforcement. This model is
described in the next section where I derive optimality conditions for escalating
punishment schemes. Section 3 discusses how the assumption that some indi-
viduals rarely lapse and commit crime relates to the literature on present-bias,
discusses how results are a¤ected by the incorporation of various alternative
assumptions, summarizes my ndings, and presents a few concluding remarks.
2. A Simple Model and Optimality Analysis
An act causes harm of h to society and confers a private benet of b to the
person committing it. There are two periods in which individuals can commit
the illegalized act. The act is ine¢ cient (b < h).14 Therefore, to deter the
commission of this act, the government declares it a crime and announces s1
and s2, which are respectively the sanctions for rst time and repeat o¤enders.
Sanctions are socially costly to impose. Following Polinsky and Shavell (2007), I
assume that imposing a sanction of s results in social costs of s.15 To simplify
the analysis, it is assumed that the government possesses a perfect detection
mechanism, which catches all individuals committing crime.
Individuals ordinarily (with a probability of (1 q)) decide whether or not to
commit a crime based on a cost-benet analysis and seek to maximize expected
values without discounting future values. But, they lack full self-control, and
in each period they may lapse (with a probability of q 2 (0; 1)), in which
case they do not compare costs and benets, and commit crime. Whether or
not an individual lapses is (randomly) determined at the beginning of each
period. The probability of a lapse (q) is constant across periods, therefore, the
probability with which an individual experiences a lapse in the second period
does not depend on whether he lapsed in the rst period. Based on these
assumptions, the decision tree an individual faces at the beginning of period 1
can be represented by gure 1, below.
[Insert Figure 1]
The government cannot determine whether an individual committed crime
based on a cost-benet analysis or because he lapsed. But it knows the relevant
parameters (i.e. h, b, q, and ), and its objective is to maximize social welfare
or, equivalently, minimize net social costs. There are two components of net
social cost: aggregate punishment costs and the cost of crime net of criminal
benets.16 The government may impose uniform, declining or escalating sanc-
14This assumption is not necessary and only simplifying. In section 3, I demonstrate that
results are preserved when there are some people with benets greater than h in addition to
people with b < h. I also discuss the case where b is distributed over [0;1).
15See Polinsky and Shavell (2007 p. 410). This appears to be the most common way of
incorporating costly sanctions.
16 I am including criminal benets in the social welfare calculus, because this appears to
be the most common approach. But, Stiglers question ("what evidence is there that society
sets a positive value upon the utility derived from a murder, rape, or arson?" Stigler (1970
p. 527)) still has not been convincingly answered in the literature. Therefore, I consider the
e¤ects of excluding criminal benets in section 3, and conclude that qualitative results do not
depend on this assumption.
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tion schemes. The analysis proceeds by identifying potentially cost minimizing
sanction schemes of each type.
2.1. Uniform Sanction Schemes (s1 = s2 = s)
Any sanction scheme with s  b deters all individuals17 who posses self-
control, and in both periods. This implies that any uniform sanction scheme
with s > b is dominated by the sanction scheme s = b, because the latter scheme
results in the same level of deterrence, but lower punishment costs (i.e. b per
o¤ense committed by those who lapse). A similar argument reveals that penalty
schemes of the form b > s > 0 are dominated by the sanction scheme s = 0;
both schemes fail to deter any individual who possesses self-control, but the
latter scheme results in lower punishment costs. This brief analysis reveals the
following result:
Observation 1: Uniform sanctions such that s =2 f0; bg cannot be optimal.
In the proceeding parts, the two remaining sanction schemes will be called
Ub and U0 where subscripts refer to the size of the uniform sanction.
2.2. Escalating Sanction Schemes (s1 < s2)
Any escalating sanction scheme with s1  b deters all individuals who are
able to exert self-control. But, the uniform sanction scheme Ub achieves the
same result, and at a lower punishment cost, because it imposes lower sanctions
to all individuals who commit crime upon losing self-control. As such, escalating
sanction schemes where s1  b are ine¢ cient. Similarly, escalating penalties of
the form b > s2 > s1 are sub-optimal, because they fail to deter all individuals
who possess self-control, and result in higher punishment costs than scheme U0.
The remaining escalating sanction schemes are of the form s2  b > s1.
When faced with a sanction scheme of this form, individuals who do not lose
self-control in the rst period know that with a probability of q they will lack
self-control in the second period and commit crime. As such, they know that
committing crime in the rst period will lead them to become repeat o¤enders
in the second period with a probability of q and results in an expected loss of
q(s2   b) in the second period. Hence, the expected pay-o¤ from committing
crime in the rst period is:
b  s1 + q(b  s2) (1)
Not committing crime, on the other hand, results in a pay-o¤ of 0 in the rst
period, and a benet of (b  s1) in the second period. This follows because the
potential o¤ender enters the second period with a clean record, which guarantees
a sanction of s1 if he commits crime. Therefore, he intentionally commits crime
in the second period if he does not lose control, and unwittingly commits crime
in the second period if he does lose self-control. As such, he is willing to commit
crime in the rst period i¤:
b  s1 + q(b  s2) > b  s1 (2)
17 Indi¤erent individuals are assumed to not commit crime.
7
This condition never holds since s2  b. Hence, escalating sanction schemes
of the form s2  b > s1 induce individuals who possess self-control to refrain
from committing crime in the rst period, but to commit crime (intentionally
or unwittingly) in the second period. This formalizes what I have termed the
temporal spillover e¤ect of escalating penalties in the introduction. Among
these sanction schemes only s1 = 0 , s2 = b, which will be called E in the
proceeding parts of this article, can potentially be optimal because the remaining
sanction schemes result in the same level of deterrence as E, but produce greater
punishment costs. This brief analysis is summarized by observation 2, below.
Observation 2: All escalating sanction schemes such that s1 6= 0 or s2 6= b
are ine¢ cient.
2.3. Declining Sanction Schemes (s1 > s2)
Declining sanction schemes of the form s1 > s2  b and b > s1 > s2 cannot
be optimal, because they produce unnecessary punishment costs as explained
in the context of escalating and uniform punishment schemes. The remaining
declining sanction schemes are of the form
s1  b > s2 (3)
Under this scheme, any person who enters the second period as a repeat o¤ender
prefers to commit a crime. As such, by committing a crime in the rst period,
a persons aggregate expected pay-o¤ is:
2b  s1   s2 (4)
To identify a persons expected pay-o¤ from not committing a crime in the rst
period, note that a person with a clean record in the second period is unwilling to
commit a crime, because this results in a sanction of s1 > b. Therefore, a person
who abstains from committing a crime in the rst period knows that he will
commit a crime in the second period only if he loses self-control which happens
with a probability of q. Hence, the expected pay-o¤ from not committing a
crime in the rst period is q(b   s1). Therefore, a person commits a crime in
the rst period i¤:
(2  q)b > (1  q)s1 + s2 (5)
Declining sanction schemes satisfying this condition cannot be optimal either,
because these sanction schemes do not deter any self-control possessing individ-
ual, and lead to greater punishment costs compared to the scheme U0. As such,
only those schemes that satisfy (6) below can potentially be optimal.
(2  q)b  (1  q)s1 + s2 (6)
Next, note that if the inequality in (6) holds strictly, punishment costs can
be reduced without a¤ecting deterrence by lowering either s1 or s2 until the left
and right hand sides of (6) are equal. Therefore, all declining schemes besides
those of the form
(2  q)b = (1  q)s1 + s2 (7)
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are ine¢ cient. Finally, note that given any sanction scheme that satises (7),
one can reduce s1 by one unit and increase s2 by (1  q) units and still satisfy
(7). Such moves reduce the amount by which rst time o¤enders are punished
by more than the amount by which the punishment of repeat o¤enders is in-
creased. Since, by denition, the number of rst time o¤enders is no less than
the number of repeat o¤enders, such moves reduce total punishment costs and
therefore enhance welfare. As such, to nd the best declining sanction scheme,
s1 should be decreased and s2 should be increased as much as conditions (7) and
(3) permit. Strictly speaking, one cannot identify the best declining sanction
scheme, because it requires s2 to be smaller than but innitesimally close to b,
and s1 to be greater than but innitesimally close to b. But, for our purposes (of
comparing the maximum achievable welfare under declining sanction schemes
to welfare achievable under other schemes) it is harmless to assume that the
best declining sanction scheme is s1 = b + " and s2 = b   (1   q)", where "
is a number very close to zero. This sanction scheme will be called D in the
remaining parts of this article. This analysis is summarized by the following
observation.
Observation 3: Let CD denote net social costs generated by scheme D.
All declining sanction schemes result in greater net social costs than lim
"!0
CD(").
2.4. Optimality Analysis
There are only four sanction schemes which remain as candidates for the
optimal sanction scheme: Ub, U0, E, and D. This section contains a few propo-
sitions which together determine the optimal sanction scheme by comparing
social welfare under all four.
Proposition 1: Declining sanction schemes cannot be optimal. In particu-
lar, Ub dominates D:
Proof: Under D, no individual intentionally commits crime in the rst
period, as such the number of individuals who commit crime in the rst period
is q. In the second period, among the (1   q) individuals who possess clean
records, q proportion lapse and commit crime. The rest of the individuals who
have a clean record, do not commit crime because s1 > b. q individuals who have
a criminal history (because they lapsed in the rst period) commit (intentionally
or due to a lapse) crime in the second period because b > s2. As such, a total
of 3q   q2 crimes are committed, and social costs are given by:
CD = (3q q2)(h b)+q(b  (1 q)")+(2q q2)(b+") > (3q q2)(h+b b)
(P.1.)
Under Ub, only those individuals who lose self-control commit crime. As
such, a total of 2q individuals commit crime, and all individuals are subjected
to sanctions of b. As such, social costs are given by:
CUb = 2q(h+ b  b) (P.2.)
It is clear that CD > CUb (since CD   CUb = q(1  q)(h+ b  b) > 0).
The main rationale behind the ine¢ ciency of declining sanction schemes re-
lates to incentives provided to ex-criminals. Declining sanction schemes provide
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a discount in sanctions to individuals who have a prior record, and one great
enough to incentivize them to commit crime. Therefore, individuals who lapse
into committing crime in the rst period commit crime again in the future, and
this results in social costs.
Next, the relationship between escalating punishment schemes and severe
uniform punishment schemes is investigated.
Proposition 2: E results in greater welfare than Ub when bh b >
1
q(2 q) 1,
i.e. when per person punishment costs are large and when gains from deterrence
is small.
Proof: It follows from (2) and the proceeding discussion that under E;
individuals commit crime in the rst period only if they lapse, individuals with
a clean record commit crime in the second period (since b > s1), and individuals
with an o¤ense history refrain from committing crime unless they lapse. Hence,
q individuals commit crime in the rst period, because they lapse. (1   q)q of
these individuals refrain from becoming repeat o¤enders because they possess self-
control, and q2 of these individuals become repeat o¤enders, because they lapse
again. (1  q) individuals refrain from committing crime in the rst period, and
commit crime (intentionally or unwittingly) in the second period. Therefore, the
total number of o¤enses is given by (1 + q2), and q2 of these constitute repeat
o¤enses. Therefore, total cost is given by:
CE = (1 + q
2)(h  b) + q2b (P.3.)
This is smaller than CUb as specied in (P.2.) i¤
2q(h+ b  b) > (1 + q2)(h  b) + q2b (P.4.)
Collecting (h  b)s and bs on separate sides (P.4.) becomes:
q(2  q)b > (1  q(2  q))(h  b) (P.5.)
Finally, by re-arranging we get:
b
h  b >
1
q(2  q)   1 (P.6.)
The economic intuition behind proposition 2 lies in the incentives provided
through escalating punishment schemes. By imposing large sanctions on repeat
o¤enders, escalating penalties give individuals a reason to avoid obtaining a
criminal record. Individuals know that they are not perfect in terms of exercis-
ing self-control. Therefore, they want to avoid the possibility of unintentionally
becoming a repeat o¤ender in the second period and being subject to greater
sanctions. This requires skipping protable criminal opportunities in the rst
period, and delaying the commission of crime to the second period. This tem-
poral spillover e¤ect allows setting the penalty for rst time o¤enders at very
low levels, since it is the prospect of unintentionally becoming a repeat o¤ender
that deters an individual and not the sanction for committing his rst o¤ense.
As such, escalating penalties result in some level of under-deterrence but very
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low aggregate punishment costs. Since the reverse is true for severe uniform
sanction schemes, the higher punishment costs (i.e. b) and the lower the cost
of under-deterrence (i.e. h   b), the more likely escalating punishments are
optimal.
The analysis proceeds by identifying the conditions under which lenient uni-
form punishment schemes (i.e. U0) are dominated by escalating punishment
schemes, although one may reasonably be tempted to rule them out as being
uninteresting,
Proposition 3: E results in more welfare than U0 when 1q2   1 > b(h b) , i.e.
when the per person punishment cost is small and when gains from deterrence
is large.
Proof: Under U0, no-one is deterred, because b > s1 = 0. Therefore, the
measure of o¤enses is 2. Since no one is punished, there are no punishment
costs. Hence, total costs are given by:
CU0 = 2(h  b) (P.7.)
This is greater than CE as specied in (P.3.) if:
2(h  b) > (1 + q2)(h  b) + q2b (P.8.)
Re-arranging we have:
1
q2
  1 > b
h  b (P.9.)
Proposition 3 formalizes the simple trade-o¤ between partial deterrence and
punishment costs. The escalating punishment scheme E deters all individuals
who do not lapse in the rst period, and individuals with a prior record in the
second period. Compared to U0, which does not lead to such partial deterrence,
E only costs q2b, which is incurred due to the punishment of a small number
(i.e. q2) of repeat o¤enders. Therefore, if q is su¢ ciently small U0 is ine¢ cient.
Corollary 1: Escalating punishment schemes are optimal when
g(q) =
1
2q   q2   1 <
b
h  b <
1
q2
  1 = f(q) (8)
and there exist ; b and h that make escalating penalties optimal.
The rst portion of corollary 1 summarizes the ndings of Propositions 1, 2
and 3, and the second portion follows immediately when one compares f(q) and
g(q) as specied in (8). More specically, f(q) > g(q) whenever q is interior.
Figure 2, below, plots f(q) and g(q) to allow a visualization of the conditions
under which escalating punishments are optimal. This gure suggests that when
punishment costs (b) and gains from deterrence (h  b) are balanced or are not
extreme in relation to each other, escalating penalties are optimal. Furthermore,
as long as q is small, E is very likely to dominate U0. If this is true, and
zero deterrence is not optimal, there is a large enough  that makes escalating
penalties socially desirable.
[Insert Figure 2]
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The rationale behind this result is partially explained by the discussions
proceeding propositions 2 and 3, and can briey be stated as follows. The ad-
vantage of escalating punishment schemes is to give individuals an incentive to
delay committing crime until the second period without using costly punish-
ment methods for rst time o¤enders. Under escalating punishment schemes,
individuals have this incentive because they fear that they may be subjected
to large sanctions for repeat o¤enders in the second period if they intention-
ally commit crime in the rst period and lapse in to committing crime in the
second period. By incentivizing individuals to delay committing crime, esca-
lating penalties achieve partial deterrence. Furthermore, punishment costs are
relatively small, because only repeat o¤enders are punished severely, and only
individuals who lapse twice become repeat o¤enders. Since the probability of
this happening is relatively small (i.e. q2), aggregate punishment costs are
relatively small.
The disadvantage of escalating punishments, in comparison to very lenient
uniform punishment schemes, is that they result in increased punishment costs.
But, as long as the probability of a lapse is small, the gains from the deterrence
of an additional (1  q2) crimes should o¤-set the cost of punishing q2 individ-
uals. The disadvantage of escalating penalties in comparison to severe uniform
punishment schemes is the under-deterrence of an additional (1  q(2  q)) in-
dividuals. This represents a sizeable cost, especially if the harm from crime
is high, and the benet to o¤enders is small. Therefore, escalating penalties
are optimal when there are signicant punishment costs, which is precisely the
assumption that was invoked by Stigler in his comment regarding escalating
penalty schemes.18
3. Remarks and Conclusion
Next, I discuss the robustness of my model by considering the e¤ects of
relaxing various assumptions, and conclude.
3.1. Partially Naive and Present-Biased Individuals
To make the analysis as simple as possible, in section 2, I captured prob-
abilistacly occuring self-control problems by assuming that people rarely lapse
into committing crime.19 Self-control problems have recently received much at-
tention in the law and economics literature.20 A particular self-control problem
occurs when the person su¤ers from present-bias,21 which refers to a persons
inability to forgo instant benets even when this implies a larger than justi-
ed future cost. If Ut represents the o¤enders utility function, , a parameter
discounting future events over events in the present, can be used to represent
18"... punishments (which have substantial costs to the state) ..." Stigler (1970 p. 529).
19For a similar assumption used in the literature see Emons (2007).
20See Fennell (2009) for a review of previously identied self-control problems, and their
relevance to legal policy.
21See McAdams (2011) discussing present bias in the context of criminal law.
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present-bias problems:22
Ut = ut +  (ut+1 + ut+2 + ut+3)
where ut denotes the expected utility at time t. In this setting, if the potential
o¤ender decides whether to commit crime at stage 1 (and 3), and punishment
occurs in stage 2 (and 4), it follows that a lapse, as described in this article,
corresponds to the extreme case where  = 0, because when  = 0, the person
commits the crime regardless of the magnitude of the negative utility of potential
punishment. Therefore, the model presented in this article is equivalent to one
where  is a random variable which takes on the values 0 or 1 respectively
with probabilities q and 1   q. Although this paper does not investigate the
more realistic case where individuals can draw intermediate values of s in
each period, it provides a good proxy for capturing the behavior of ordinary
individuals who generally have s close to 1, but rarely draw s close to 0. It
thereby points out that potential uctuations in self-control can cause people to
refrain from committing protable crimes in stage 1 when they have high s to
avoid receiving the large sanction for repeat o¤enders when they draw low s
in the future.
Another assumption in this paper is that o¤enders have accurate expec-
tations regarding the likelihood with which they will experience self-control
problems. This is a variant of the assumption that o¤enders are sophisticated,
i.e. "fully aware of her future self-control problems". (ODonoghue and Rabin
(2001) at p. 122) This assumption can be replaced by one of partial naivite,23
where individuals have mistaken beliefs about how much they are likely to suf-
fer from present bias in the future. The temporal spillover e¤ect of escalating
penalty schemes continues to exist even in this setting. This is because even
partially naive individuals know that if they enter stage 3 with a prior record,
and experience self-control issues, they will be inclined to commit crime, because
b > bs2 = bb in scheme E,24 where b < 1 denotes the ex-convicts partially
naive belief about his degree of self-control.25 Hence, when potential o¤enders
do not experience self-control issues in stage 1, they can stop their future selves
from being punished as repeat o¤enders by refraining from committing crime.
On the other hand, if they experience self-control issues in stage 1, they will be
inclined to commit crime, because they perceive a cost of (1   )b to delaying
crime, which o¤-sets the cost of being punished as a repeat o¤ender in stage
3.26 Accordingly, under escalating punishment schemes the behavior of partially
naive individuals with uctuating self-control issues is identical to the behavior
of the individuals analyzed in section 2.2., and the main e¤ect identied in this
article, namely the temporal spillover e¤ect, is preserved.
22ODonoghue and Rabin (2001) and Baumann and Friehe (2012) use similar utility func-
tions.
23See ODonoghue and Rabin (2001) developing a model of partial naivite.
24See section 2.2., above.
25 I am following the notation and assumptions in ODonoghue and Rabin (2001).
26This cost is negligible since s2 = b. Throughout the model it is assumed that an indi¤erent
individual is deterred from committing crime, see supra note 17. If he is not, then the results
described here can be obtained by setting s2 slightly above b.
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3.2. What Happens if There are Potential O¤enders with Criminal
Benets Exceeding Harm?
In section 2, I assume that all individuals receive the same benet from
crime, and that such benets are exceeded by the harm caused by crime. In
this sub-section, I add into the model potential o¤enders who receive criminal
benets exceeding the harm from crime and show that escalating punishments
are optimal under an even broader set of conditions. Then, I show that anal-
ogous results are obtained when there is a continuum of o¤ender types and
the density of criminal benets among individuals is described by a continuous
function. I only compare uniform and escalating sanction schemes.
3.2.1. Two Types of Potential O¤enders
Let bh and bl be the criminal benets of type H and type L individuals
respectively, with bh > h > bl, and let the ratio of type H individuals to type
L individuals be . Due to reasons underlying Observation 1, uniform schemes
where s 62 f0; bl; bhg are ine¢ cient. Let U0, Ubl , and Ubh denote the remaining
three uniform sanction schemes where subscripts denote the size of the uniform
sanction. In addition to these three schemes, consider the escalating sanction
schemes Ebl and Ebh where subscripts denote the size of s2, and s1 = 0 under
both sanction schemes. Repeating the steps outlined in section 2 and making
the relevant modications, it can be veried that net social costs under each
regime are given by:
CU0 = 2(h  bl) + 2(h  bh) (9)
CUbl = 2q(h  bl) + 2(h  bh) + 2(q + )bl (10)
CUbh = 2q(h  bl) + 2q(h  bh) + 2q(1 + )bh (11)
CEbl = (1 + q
2)(h  bl) + 2(h  bh) + (+ q2)bl; and (12)
CEbh = (1 + q
2)(h  bl) + (1 + q2)(h  bh) + (1 + )q2bh (13)
Next, one can determine the conditions under which U0 is dominated by
one of the two escalating punishment schemes. In particular, by separately
comparing CEbl and CEbh with CU0 , one can verify that one of the two escalating
punishment schemes dominates U0 if
max

h  bl   bl
h  bl + bl ;
(1 + )(h  bl)  (bh   bl)
(1 + )(h+ bh   bl)  (bh   bl)

> q2 (14)
In the remainder of the analysis, I will assume that (14) holds, because if it does
not, no deterrence is optimal and the case is relatively uninteresting.27
By comparing (10) and (11) one can note that Ubh is likely to be dominated
by Ubl if bh is su¢ ciently greater than h. This follows because Ubh deters the
27This follows because when (14) does not hold Ui is dominated by Ei for i 2 fbl; bhg.
This can be veried by noting that a violation of (14) implies (i) that bl
h bl 
1+
q2+
  1 >
1+
q(2 q)+  1, which is the condition for Ebl dominating Ubl and (ii) that
bh
h bl  1+ (bh bl)

1
q2
  1 > 1
q(2 q)   1, which is the condition for Ebh dominating Ubh .
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commission of e¢ cient crimes (since bh > h). On the other hand, the only
benet is a reduction in punishment costs, which is borne by fewer type H
individuals committing crime and being punished. More specically, Ubh is
dominated by Ubl if
bh   h > bl   (1 + )q
(1  q) (bh   bl) (15)
If (15) holds, one can compare CEbl to CUbl to obtain a su¢ cient condition for
the optimality of escalating punishment schemes:
bl
h  bl >
1 + 
q(2  q) +    1 (16)
Note that this condition is weaker than the corresponding condition in (8),
because the right hand side of (16) is decreasing in  and achieves its maximum
when  = 0. Therefore, the inclusion of type H individuals whose benets
su¢ ciently exceed h makes it more likely for escalating penalty schemes to be
optimal. A similar conclusion is reached when bh is close to h and (15) does not
hold. In this case, one can compare CEbh to CUbh to derive a condition under
which escalating penalties are optimal, which is given by:
bh
h  bl   1+ (bh   bl)
>
1
q(2  q)   1 (17)
This, too, is a condition weaker than the corresponding condition in (8), because
the left hand side of (17) is increasing in , and achieves its minimum when
 = 0. Accordingly, the inclusion of type H individuals weakens the conditions
under which escalating penalties are optimal, regardless of by how much bh
exceeds h.
The rationale behind this result is simple. Type H individuals are people
who contribute to total social welfare when they commit crime, but whose pun-
ishment is equally costly as the punishment of type L individuals. Therefore,
their inclusion increases the relative cost of punishment in comparison to gains
from deterrence. Since the main feature of escalating punishments is to reduce
punishment costs at the price of a reduction in deterrence, they are more likely
to be optimal when this price is relatively low.
3.2.2. Continuum of Types of Potential O¤enders
To extend the analysis to the case where there is a continuum of potential
o¤ender types, let z(b) describe the density of benets among individuals, and
let it be positive for all b  0. If Z(:) is the corresponding cumulative distribu-
tion function, one can verify that the measure of crimes committed under any
uniform sanction scheme is given by:
2qZ(s) + 2(1  Z(s)) (18)
where s denotes the uniform sanction. This follows, because individuals with
b  s refrain from committing crime whenever they possess self-control, and the
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rest of the individuals always commit crime. As such, net social costs are given
by:
CUs = 2 (qZ(s) + (1  Z(s))) s+ 2q
sZ
0
(h  b)z(b)db+ 2
1Z
s
(h  b)z(b)db (19)
Next, consider the corresponding escalating penalty scheme which imposes
a sanction of s to repeat o¤enders and 0 to rst time o¤enders. Faced with
this sanction scheme -due to reasons explained in sub-section 2.2.- individuals
with b  s who possess self-control in the rst period refrain from committing
crime in the rst period and commit crime in the second period. Those who
lapse in the rst period commit crime in the second period only if they re-lapse.
Individuals with b > s commit crime in both periods. Therefore, net social costs
are given by:
CEs =
 
q2Z(s) + (1  Z(s)) s+(1+q2) sZ
0
(h b)z(b)db+2
1Z
s
(h b)z(b)db (20)
Comparing (19) and (20) reveals that Es leads to greater social welfare than Us
when
s
sR
0
(h  b)z(b)db
>
1  q(2  q)
q(2  q)Z(s) + 1  Z(s) (21)
(21) is the condition that corresponds to (16) and (17) when there is a continuum
of types. It should be noted that this is a su¢ cient -and not necessary- condition.
In this setting, there could be many escalating punishments with s1 6= 0 that
out perform Es. But, since the purpose here is to demonstrate that escalating
penalties, in general, can out perform uniform sanction schemes, focusing on
(21) should be harmless. It is easy to see that for any s > 0, there is a 
large enough such that (21) holds. As such, as indicated by the discussion in
section 2 and sub-section 3.2.1., escalating punishments are optimal as long as
punishment is su¢ ciently costly and a degree of deterrence is socially desirable.
One can also conjecture about how the distribution of criminal benets af-
fects the analysis. The greater the densities z(:) distributes over large bs, the
more likely are escalating penalties optimal. One can arrive at this conclusion,
which is consistent with results discussed in sub-section 3.2.1., by noting that
Z(s) is smaller when z(:) distributes greater values to large bs. Therefore, the
right hand side of (21) is smaller. Furthermore, there is a second e¤ect; when
z(:) assigns higher densities to large bs, the integrand in the denominator of
the left hand side of (21) is smaller in magnitude for small values of b, which
are precisely the bs that are being summed by the integral. Therefore the left
hand side of (21) is greater. Accordingly, escalating penalties are more likely to
be optimal when z(:) assigns greater densities to large criminal benets.
Overall, sub-sections 3.2.1. and 3.2.2. suggest that results presented in
section 2 extend to more sophisticated models where there are multiple or an
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innite number of potential o¤ender types, and that escalating penalties are
more likely to be optimal when the average benet from crime is high. Next,
I consider whether results change if, as suggested by some scholars, criminal
benets do not enter the social welfare function.
3.3. Excluding Criminal Benets from Social Welfare
The analysis in section 3 was conducted by conventionally including criminal
benets in the social welfare function. However, there is a controversial and
unsettled debate as to whether this is the proper way to proceed. Fortunately,
the nature of the results presented in this article is not altered by the particular
assumption concerning the inclusion (or exclusion) of criminal benets in social
welfare.
First, note that potential o¤enders behavior does not depend at all on
whether or not criminal benets enter the social welfare function. Therefore, the
portion of the analysis that relates to individualsbest responses to sanctions
chosen by the government remains unchanged. Furthermore, observations 1, 2,
and 3 also remain una¤ected, because these rely only on the size and frequency
of punishment costs to identify ine¢ cient sanction schemes. The remaining
parts of the analysis can quickly be repeated by excluding criminal benets
from social welfare. This corresponds to removing b from the denominator of
(8), which yields:28
1
2q   q2   1 <
b
h
<
1
q2
  1 (22)
(22) establishes that the nature of the results are preserved when criminal ben-
ets are excluded from the social welfare function. Quantitatively, given that
q is small, the constraint that is likely to be more problematic is the one that
requires the ratio between the per person punishment cost and the cost of crime
to be great. Because this ratio is greater when criminal benets are included
it increases from bh to
b
h b -, escalating penalties are more likely to be optimal
when criminal benets count. This result is consistent with the previous discus-
sion in sub-section 3.2., which suggests that escalating penalties are more likely
to be optimal when the average criminal benet is large.
3.4. Is the Analysis Equally Applicable when Individuals can be
Wrongfully Convicted?
At rst glance, it appears as if models incorporating weak-willed individ-
uals should produce the same results as models incorporating the possibility
of wrongful convictions. However, there are many important di¤erences be-
tween the two models, which become apparent once one carefully reviews them.
First, unlike wrongfully convicted individuals, o¤enders who lapse generate ac-
tual harms by committing crime. Second, although the number of individuals
who lapse is constant (i.e. q fraction of the population in both periods) the
number of individuals who are wrongfully convicted depends on individuals
28This can quickly be veried by modifying (P.1.)(P.9.) to reect the exclusion of criminal
benets from welfare and re-obtaining the two conditions which generate (8) in corollary 1.
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decisions to commit crime. Third, whereas a wrongful conviction occurs only
after an individual decides whether to commit a crime, a lapse, by denition,
occurs to determine if one has the ability to decide whether to commit crime.
Fourth, there are unsettled debates as to what the proper method is to include
wrongful convictions in law enforcement models.29 Due to these reasons, further
investigation is required before one can conclude that the instant model can (or
cannot) be used to evaluate the desirability of escalating punishment schemes
when wrongful convictions are possible.
3.5. Concluding Remarks
This article represents an attempt to incorporate weak-willed potential of-
fenders into the standard law enforcement model to investigate the social desir-
ability of repeat o¤ender laws. When potential o¤enders are weak-willed and
punishment is costly, a rationale emerges for punishing repeat o¤enders more
severely, which is based on o¤endersprecautionary abstention from crime. Op-
timality of escalating punishment requires that punishment costs are signicant,
and that some degree of deterrence is desirable. Once these conditions are met,
escalating punishments become optimal in a variety of settings; they are socially
desirable when all or only some crimes are ine¢ cient, when potential o¤enders
benets count, and when they are excluded from social welfare. Furthermore,
the optimality of escalating penalties does not require punishment to cost more
when committed by individuals who lapse. Accordingly the instant article pro-
vides a behavioral justication for escalating punishment schemes, which is valid
under a wide variety of assumptions.
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